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DIALOGUE

"Anxiety" in Heidegger's Being and Time:
The Harbinger of Authenticity
J.M. Magrini
DePaul University
ABSTRACT: Analyzing the fundamental ontology of Dasein in Martin Heidegger's
Being and Time, this essay details the essential relation ship between the mood of
"anxiety" (Angst) and Dasein ' s authentic comportment to existence. Although a highly
disturbing experience, anxiety holds the potential for enlightenment, as it opens Dasein
to the fundamental characteristics of its temporal authenticity. Dasein assents to its
Selfhood and enacts its freedom in a "resolute," authentic manner only when it grasps the
difficult and burdensome aspects of life revealed by way of Angst's attunement. Thus,
I argue that anxiety is the single most important mode of human attunement that
Heidegger describes.

understanding in which the existent
Dasein does not understand itself primarily by that apprehended possibility of
itself which is most peculiarly its own"
(Basic Problems of Phenomenology,
279). In the inauthentic mode, Dasein's
understanding and discourse are expressed
within the idle talk and curiosity of the
"they-self," disclosing existence in a
superficial and ambiguous manner.
Tranquilized by what seems a complete
understanding of things, Dasein never
sets out to acquire an authentic understanding of existence and is unconcerned
with the clear-sighted projection of its
ownmost possibilities. Lost in the "theyself," Dasein does not enact its own
Being and either avoids, or remains
oblivious to, the uniqueness and
"peculiarity" of its Being and its genuine
possibilities.
This lack of authentic self-understanding
is a problem for Heidegger, who is concerned with bringing Dasein . back to
itself to face its own Being with honesty
and integrity. Asking how Dasein's ownmost potentiality-for-Being is to be
grasped and enacted, Heidegger offers a
solution that spans nearly the entirety of
Division II of Being and Time. When
Dasein exists authentically, he concludes, "Dasein is itself in and from its
own most peculiar possibility , a possibility that has been seized on and chosen by

This essay examines the relationship
between the mood of anxiety (Angst) and
Dasein's authentic comportment to
existence. It will be shown that anxiety is
a potentially enlightening experience,
which brings Dasein before the most
fundamental characteristics of authenticity,
including Dasein's awareness of its ownmost potentiality-for-Being, which it
projects while bearing the full weight of
its primordial guilt, thereby owning up to
the "nothingness" at the root of its Being,
and further, facing the uttermost, insurmountable "certainty" of its possible
non-existence, or death. As a far-reaching primordial possibility of disclosure,
anxiety makes manifest in Dasein its
"Being towards its ownmost potentialityfor-Being - that is, its Being}ree for the
freedom of choosing itself and taking
hold of itself' (Being and Time ,
232/188). To choose and take hold of
oneself, as Heidegger conceives, is to
assent to one's own most potentiality-forBeing and exist in an authentic manner.
This includes Being-in-the-world in such
a way that one is beholden to the past
and accountable for the future .
For the most part, Dasein exists in
an inauthentic manner (everydayness),
which amounts to choosing not to choose
itse(f, and is characterized by the perpetual movement of falling. This mode of
existence for Heidegger denotes "an
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the Dasein itself' (BP, 287). Authentic
existence constitutes Dasein's most
extreme possibility of existing, which
primarily determines its Being. As
opposed to moving along passively with
the ebb and flow of things, Dasein, for
the first time, is emphatically choosing to
choose itself and its own way in the
world. It is for this reason that Heidegger
considers authentic existence an extreme
possibility for Dasein. 1 However, before
Dasein comports itself authentically, it
must be brought back from falling and
the "they-self' to instead face itself and
the ultimate conditions of existence. This
is accomplished by way of the revelatory
mood (Stimmung) of anxiety, which for
Heidegger represents the harbinger of
authenticity.
Moods are fundamental states of
attunement that color Dasein 's disposition
and awareness, out of which it uncovers,
or discloses, things that matter. Prior to
comporting itself to any situation, Dasein
is already immersed within a mood of
some kind, as attunement is always at
work influencing its worldly orientation.
Heidegger describes attunement as a primordial way of Being that precedes "all
cognition and volition, and [is] beyond
their range of disclosure" (BT, ] 75/136).
However, not all moods are equally
revealing. For example, everyday moods
such as love, happiness, boredom, irritability, and fear do not provide fundamental existential insight into Dasein' s
Being as a whole, <l!ld instead reveal the
world in a restricted and limited manner.
Veiling more than they disclose, "everyday moods" lead to a diminished awareness. Therefore, instead of pressing forth
into its possibilities in a lucid manner,
Dasein responds inappropriately and
inadequately to the situation at hand, as
is the case when Dasein, in the mood of
fear, "becomes unsure of everything else
and completely loses [its] head."2
Heidegger's task within Being and
Time is to carry out what he defines as
the "fundamental ontology" of Dasein.
In order for the existential analytic to
master its provisional task of exhibiting

Dasei n ' s Being, it must first locate the
most far-reaching, primordial mode of
attunement that effectively reveals
Dasei n' s entire structural make-up. In
quest of this primordial mode of disclosure, Heidegger searches for the "right
mood," that is, the mood that most effectively brings to light the oppressive,
disturbing character of existence, and for
this reason examines anxiety (Angst) ,
a pri mordial state of Dasein' s attunement. Anxiety reveals existence as a
phenomenon that eludes all attempts to
explain and control it, thus opening up
the fundamental elements of Dasein' s
existence, revealing its "world as world,"
bringing forth its most important and
authentic possibilities in light of finitude.
According to Heidegger, the fundamental mood of anxiety is the most
rudimentary form of disclosure that
attunes Dasein to its existence, more
primordial and .revelatory than any
other average everyday mood. Anxiety
exposes Dasein to the fundamental
nature of its Being-in-the-world by
. bringing it before the great void of existence, and is therefore crucial to Dasein's
authentic existential understanding of
such phenomena as "death," "nothingness," and "thrownness." This awareness
then attunes Dasein as it enacts its
authentic possibilities in the existentiell.
In essence, anxiety is about "nothingness," or the "nullity" that resides at the
center of Dasein's Being. Heidegger
views the issue of existential nothingness
as a pressing philosophical concern,
which is to be confronted and interrogated.
The monumental significance of "nUllity"
within Being and Time is evident when
we come to understand that without the
ultimate "anxious" encounter with the
"nothing" of existence Dasein can neither legitimately approach the possibility
of its Selfhood nor authentically enact its
freedom. '
Anxiety is about death and guilt,
awakening Dasein to the inherent
instability and indefiniteness of its finite
existence. However, anxiety is not a fear
of a particular entity in the world. Rather,
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meaning, force, and significance. Things
that were once familiar and comprehendible show themselves in problematic
ways. Dasein is momentarily "left
hanging" as a homeless, thrown being.
Alienated, in the mode of the "not-athome" (Unheimlichkeit), Dasein is forced
before the " nothingness" of existence. 4
This primordial, " uncanny" existential
mode of the " not-at-home" represents for
Heidegger the most fundamental way of
existence, acting to individualize Dasein
for its own Being, revealing the unique,
individual possibilities, which it alone
has the potential to enact as Being-inthe-world.
However, the individualization (existential solipsism) that occurs in anxiety
is the exact opposite of solipsism as traditionally conceived, i.e., as a retreat into
the secluded interiority of the consciousness, and is instead Dasein's bold
reclaiming of its world and Being.
Anxiety works on Dasein so as to bring it
out of the world of the "they-self' to face
its own "world as world, and thus bring
it face to face with itself as Being-in-theworld" (ST, 233/188). Anxiety frees
Dasein to take hold of its existence by
throwing it back upon that which it is
most anxious about - its own potentialityfor-Being-in-the-world
provoking
Dasein to reflect upon that which matters
most in its existence. Heidegger claims
that anxiety arises out of Being-in-theworld as a whole, and when Dasein is
anxious, its Being as "care" is disclosed.
"Thus the entire phenomenon of anxiety
shows Dasein as factically existing
Being-in-the-world. The fundamental
ontological characteristics of this entity
are existentiality, facti city , and Beingfallen " (ST, 2351191).
The ontological understanding of care
provides important insight into Dasein's
existence, as the three modes (ecstases)
of temporality are implicit within its
definition as "ahead-of-itself-as-alreadyin-the-world" and "Being-alongside" in
the world.5 Heidegger views primordial
temporality, the ontological meaning of
the care-structure, as a finite phenomenon.

anxiety is a generalized, highly disturbing dread arising from Dasein, which
induces a crisis of meaning. Anxiety
provokes a shattering breakdown in the
everyday, familiar ways in which Dasein
conducts its life and most dramatically
illustrates the principle of breakdown
and revelation within Heidegger's
philosophy. For example, in Division I,
Section ill, Chapter 16 (Being and
Time), Heidegger analyzes the breakdown of "ready-to-hand" equipment and
the subsequent revelation of "world"
through the phenomenon of the "unready-to-hand." When a tool functions
properly, its authentic "readiness-tohand" remains inconspicuous. On the
contrary, when a tool ceases to function
properly, or becomes unusable, it quickly
draws the attention of the user to the
system of relations of which it is a part
as it is directed toward a specific task. At
the instant of breakdown, Dasein catches
sight of everything connected to the
work; the totality of the "workshop," so
to speak, is lit up. The nature of "equipmentality" and the referential totality of
the "ready-to-hand" are simultaneously
made explicit, disclosing the overall
purpose of the project (towards-this) and
the manner in which the project must
proceed in order to reach fruition (il1.order-to). Anxiety induces a similar phenomenon, albeit on a larger scale, for in
the moment of Angst's attunement, the
entirety of Dasein's existence is disrupted ,
its life no longer "works," or functions
with meaning. A breakdown occurs, and
the phenomenon of the world announces
its presence, disclosing the complex
system of reference relations within
which Dasein is immersed.
When the world announces its presence in anxiety, Dasein' s everyday existence (inauthentic) falls into a state of
confusion; meanings and interrelations
are lost, and a slipping away of beings
occurs. At the moment anxiety swells,
Dasein no longer feels at home within
the comfort and safety of its inauthentic
Being-in-the-world, as the thoughts and
interpretations of the "they-self' lose
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" Care itself, in its very essence," argues
Heidegger, "is permeated with nullity
(nothingness) through and through" (BT,
331/285). Hence, due to the nature of its
being, Dasein endures a finite existence
and inevitably faces insurmountable
obstacles, which restrict and shape its
possibilities and the enactment thereof. It
is anxiety that discloses the limitations of
Dasein's existence by revealing the three
ways in which "nothingness" manifests
itself existentially within the care-structure: (1) Death (2) thrown ness and facticity, and (3) the impossibi Iity of enacting
all possibilities. These delimiting factors
represent the primordial "nothingness"
with which Dasein, enduring a finite
existence, must come to terms in order to
exist authentically.
"The Nothing with which anxiety
brings us face to face," writes Heidegger,
"unveils the nullity by which Dasein, in
its very basis, is defined; and this basis
itself is as thrownness into death" (BT,
356/308). Anxiety is about death.
Inauthentic Dasein interprets death as if
it were only a biological truism, signifying
nothing more than the physical cessation
of the organism. Falling within the
everyday mode of existence, Dasein
misses the existential significance of
death and treats it as a present-at-hand
thing or occurrence. For example, viewing
death as an event that happens to others,
or as a quasi-established, abstracted
truth, which occurs at some point in
Dasein's distant future, characterizes a
"fleeing in the face 0f death," which is
ultimately a fleeing from anxiety,
described by Heidegger as a "fleeing of
Dasein in the face of itself - of itself as
an
authentic
potentiality-for-Beingits-Self' (BT, 2291184). Living in an
inauthentic way, in the midst of the
"they-self," Dasein allows denial and
deception to shield it from the pressing
impact and monumental import of its
mortality. Conversely, authentic Dasein
interprets the oppressive void of -anxiety
and the ultimate nothingness of death as
the single most integral aspect of authentic
comportment. When Dasein, uncanny

and individuated, with its worldly relations severed, is brought before the utter
possibility of its no-Ionger-being-able-tobe, its ownmost authentic potentialityfor-Being is revealed as Being-towardsdeath . It not only attunes itself to the
inevitability of mortality, but also projects the "uncanniness" of anxiety into
its futural existence. This, for Heidegger,
represents the existential understanding
of death as a "Being-certain of death,"
or mortality, and when Dasein takes on
this possibi Iity as its own possibility, it
is anticipating and "running ahead"
(vorlaufen) towards or up to its death,
with the dual recognition of its
inevitability and indeterminate nature, as
death, the uttermost possibility of nonbeing, can occur at any moment.
Dasein is free for the possibility of
death when it accepts its mortality, and
this is what Heidegger calls the "freedom
towards death. " At the moment Dasein is
free for death, open for what is possible
at any moment, all of its possibilities are
subordinated to the uttermost possibility
of death and thus become provisional.
In its "running ahead" to death in anticipation, Dasein is liberated from its
absorption in the "they" of everyday
existence and understands its existence
in terms of its factical possibilities,
which are constrained and shaped by
mortality. As Heidegger indicates, anticipation is something other than merely
Being-certain of death's inevitability;
more importantly, it is the freedom for
possibilities within which Dasein holds
and maintains itself. Being-certain for
death is only disclosed when Dasein
enacts the "not-yet" that is always a part
of its "Being-ahead-of-itself." In anticipation, Dasein recognizes death as a constant and legitimate threat arising from
anxiety's latent presence, which holds
Dasein open to "the utter and constant
threat to itself arising from [its] ownmost
individualized Being" (BT, 310/266).
Thus , anticipation is also about anxiety,
as "running ahead" to death is Dasein's
authentic comportment to death and
includes maintaining, or holding, oneself
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The reticent voice of conscience
speaks from the depths of anxiety's rumbling silence. The summons of "Beingguilty" is potentially audible because of
Dasein's ontological predisposition for
hearing:

within the threat of death ' s indefinite
certainty.
In Division II, Chapter I (Seing and
Time) , Heidegger ends the discussion of
death by explicating the ontological
possibility of the existential projection
of anticipation. The question remains.
whether or not any phenomenon in
Dasein's existence actually realizes this
"ontological-existential" possibility of a
Being-towards-death in the concrete,
existentiell, i.e., "Dasein' s ability to
come to owe anything in facti cally
existing" (ST, 332/286). Heidegger demonstrates that such a phenomenon exists
and refers to it as the "conscience."
When Dasein owns up to the primordial
guilt of existence (nothingness), which
conscience formalizes and "silently"
communicates, it therefore fulfills the
ontological conclusions about death and
is free for the pursuit of its own finite
possibilities within concrete existenfiell
situations.
Heidegger does not express conscience in traditional psychological , ethical, or religious terms. Rather, he views
conscience as a form of understanding,
expressed as a silent voice which urges
Dasein to end its flight into the inauthentic world, i.e., face the "nothingness" of
its Being as thrown-prqjection, own up
to its primordial guilt, and assume the
responsibility of enacting its authentic
potentiality-for-Being. In vocalizing what
anxiety intimates, conscience reminds
Dasein that it does not control its own
Being, as the C;lr-e-structure is ultimately
grounded in primordial "nothingness."
Since anxiety discloses this fact it is
therefore integral to the phenomenon of
conscience. "In uncanniness ," reminds
Heidegger, "Dasein stands together with
itself primordially. Uncanniness brings
this entity face to face with its undisguised nullity, which belongs to the
possibility of its own most potentialityfor-Being" (BT, 333/287). Like facing
death, the acceptance of guilt's burden
requires Dasein to confront the disturbing truths of existence brought to light in
anxiety.

Only in keeping silent does the
conscience call; that is to say, the
call comes from the soundlessness
of uncannniness, and the Dasein
which it summons is called back into
the stillness of itself, and called back
as something that is to become still.
Only in reticence, therefore, is
this silent discourse understood
appropriately in wanting to have a
conscience. It takes the words away
from the common-sense idle talk of
the "they" (ST, 343/296).
The uncanny call of Dasein (conscience) in its thrown "nothingness" is
unfamiliar to the ordinary, everyday
Dasein and thus resonates as a distant,
"alien" voice. The silent discourse of
conscience rings in an unfamiliar and
anomalous manner within the loud
confusion of inauthentic existence. For
this reason, the voice penetrates the crash
and rattle of idle chatter and reaches the
"they-self,"
attempting
to
induce
Dasein 's authentic "Self' to pay heed to
its message and return "into the reticence
(~f [its] existent potentiality-for-Being"
(BT, 322/277). However, to merely
have the voice of conscience reach the
inauthentic Dasein is not sufficient to
call it back from the "they" into its
existent potentiality-for-Being. For the
possibility exists that Dasein, absorbed
within its fallen everyday existence, may
ignore the call, fail to understand it, or
remain oblivious to its urgent communications. Hence, just as there exists an
inauthentic reaction to death, there exists
an inauthentic response to conscience.
Heidegger states that as Dasein runs
from its primordial guilty nature, it is
again fleeing the oppression of anxiety,
and in this instance it is "fleeing in the
face of the conscience."
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"is only in the choice of one possibility that is, in tolerating one's not having
chosen the others and one's not being
able to choose them" (BT, 331/285).
It has been the aim of this work to
analyze anxiety as the harbinger of
authenticity, but as a neutral mode of
attunement, Angst is the forerunner to
both Dasein' s authentic and inauthentic
modes of comportment. Thus, to merely
stand courageously before anxiety does
not amount to "choosing" an authentic
existence based on what anxiety reveals,
for Angst "merely brings one into the
mood for a possible resolution" (BT,
394/344). If anxiety is to be considered
and acknowledged as the harbinger of
authenticity, an active move in which
Dasein chooses to choose itse(f is
required (recall the contrast between
Dasein ' s authentic choosing to choose
itse(f and the inauthentic choosing not to
choose itse(f). Dasein must therefore
incorporate the insight gained in anxiety
and actively take on the responsibility of
its death and the guilt-ridden "nothingness" of its existence. Heidegger locates
the means by which to open Dasein to
the enactment of its authentic potentialityfor-Being within the phenomenon of
"resoluteness" (Entschlossenheit), which
is to say, positively incorporating
anxiety's seemingly negative influence:

Heidegger argues that guilt, in the
everyday sense, emerges when Dasein
endeavors to cover over, or flee from, the
agitation it experiences by way of Angst.
Attempting to quell its unsettledness,
Dasein passively adopts the ethical
mores of the "they-self" as rigid criteria
for its behavior. When the voice of the
"they-self' is erroneously protracted and
universalized, it forms that which
Heidegger refers to as the "world
conscience." To envisage the conscience
as an objective, formalized phenomenon,
with content supplied by the venerable
obligation to religious beliefs, principles
of reason, or societal mores, is to
respond in an inauthentic manner to the
call of the existential conscience.
Although the voice of the conscience is
the call of care (Dasein's own call), inauthentic Dasein judges the caller "after the
manner of the world," i.e., the collective
voice of the "they-self," and interprets
conscience as a power that it can "come
across Objectively" (BT, 323/278).
Heidegger contends that the traditional
conception of conscience and guilt, as
expressed
within
psychology and
religion, for example, originate from the
misunderstanding of the existential
conSClence.
Unlike the everyday idea of guilt,
existential guilt is a form of obligation
characterized by an emptiness, a lack of
content, which Heidegger expresses in
the following terms: "Being-the-basis for
a being that is defined by a 'not' - that is
to say, as Being-the-c2sis of a nullity"
(BT, 329/283). Dasein is guilty because
its possibilities for the future , past, and
present are all influenced and constrained
by the primordial "nothingness" that
resides in the care-structure. To enact its
authentic existence, Dasein must own up
to its guilt. It must acknowledge and
accept that the possibilities that it seeks
to project itself upon are limited by
"nothingness," which manifests itself in
thrown-Being, death, and the fact that in
choosing one possibility it is therefore
precluding a host of other equally viable
options. "Freedom," writes Heidegger,

lA]nxiety can mount authentically
only in a Dasein which is resolute.
He who is resolute knows no fear;
but he understands the possibility of
anxiety as the possibility of the very
mood which neither inhibits nor
bewilders him. Anxiety liberates
him .from possibilities which "count
for nothing", and lets him become
free for those which are authentic
(BT,394/344).
To initiate authentic Being-in-theworld, a transformation of inauthentic
existence is required. Dasein must submit
to the . disturbing revelations of anxiety
by way of "wanting-to-have-a-conscience,"
i.e., choosing to own up to its being-the-

82

April, 2006

DIALOGUE

influence of the "they-self," pushes forward authentically into its possibilities
with the existential understanding of
what is factically possible at each and
every moment. 7
The authentic Situation of Dasein is
not an axiomatic guide to authentic
behavior, presenting a theoretical schema
for human existence. Instead, it is an
authentic way of inhabiting the present
moment, which modifies and clarifies
Dasein ' s relationships, i.e., its concerned
dealings with entities and its solicitous
Being-with-Others. The Situation is the
authentic clearing of Being, an opening
for the enactment of Dasein's authentically owned possibilities. Seizing upon
the existential understanding of thrownness and death, Dasein makes its choices
in light of its uncertain future and
thrown-past. It is within the Situation
that Dasein' s freedom is born of the
relationship between its choices and the
constraints that shape its possibilities. To
erroneously conceive resoluteness as a
deliberate choice, which estab1ishes the
permanent transformation of Dasein, is
to truncate freedom and eradicate the
possibility of ethics, and thus deny to
existence "nothing less than the very
possibility of taking action in a particular
Situation" (RT, 345/298).
When "resolute" Dasein comports
itself, anxiety has extinguished intrinsic
meaning from its life, and the reasons for
acting and making choices hinge upon
the "disclosive projection and determination of what is factically possible at the
time" (RT, 345/298). Authenticity does
not provide life with a new content, for
authentic existence is in fact devoid of
content, nor does it alienate Dasein from
the world. Rather, authenticity "brings
the Self right into its current concernful
being alongside what is ready-to-hand,
and pushes it into solicitous Being-withothers" (RT, 344/298). Authenticity is
a shift in the framework of Dasein' s
existence, transforming the "context" in
which it enacts its approaching possibilities.
Authentic Being-in-the-world is a spontaneous way of living in which Dasein is

basis of a nullity as thrown-projection.
This blameworthy attitude, or authentic
hearing of the call of conscience, is
Dasein's ownmost Self taking action "in
itself on its own accord in its Beingguilty, and represents phenomenally that
authentic potentiality-for-Being which
Dasein itself attests" (RT, 342/295). The
authentic understanding of conscience,
which signifies a readiness for anxiety, is
what Heidegger terms "resoluteness,"
which is the authentic "disclosedness"
of Dasein. This distinctive mode of
"disclosedness" holds within itself
Dasein's authentic Being-towards-death
"as the possible existential modality for
its own authenticity," which it enacts in
the existentiell (RT, 353/305). Heidegger
links resoluteness, as disclosedness, or
"uncovering," to the authentic truth
(aletheia) of existence, "the most primordial, and indeed the most authentic
disclosedness," in which Dasein is its
potentiality-for-Being (RT, 264/221).
In the moment of resolute openness,
which is nothing other than wanting to
have a conscience, throwing itself down
upon its Being-guilty in readiness for
anxiety, Dasein opens itself to what
Heidegger terms the "Situation," or the
authentic way of "Being-there" (RT,
347/300). As previously stated, Dasein's
authentic
existence
represents
an
emphatic "choosing to choose" itself.
However, to understand Heidegger's
conception of Dasein in the moment of
resoluteness, the traditional notion of
volition as the "deliberate choice of a
subject" must be reconsidered. (, This is
because resolute Dasein is not willfully
choosing
between
the
competing
alternatives of inauthentic and authentic
existence. Rather, Dasein is opening
itself up to Being; its "choice," so to
speak., is already made when it allows
itself to be called by conscience to own
up to guilt and accept the "nothingness"
of existence. Therefore, Dasein is not so
much "choosing" authenticity and the
Situation as it is choosing its actions
within specific situations. In resoluteness, Dasein, released from the oppressive

83

April,2006

DIALOGUE

of the Situation. This "ecstatic" temporal
process represents the letting be of
Being, which has been defined as the
authentic truth of existence. Thus, when
Dasein exists authentically, it experiences the world in its basic "unconcealment" - allowing that which shows itse(f
from itse(f to be seen - now not disclosing beings, but the phenomenon of world
as such, i.e., the overarching matrix of
meaning
and
purpose
structuring
Dasein's Being-in-the-world.
The concluding remarks focus on
Dasein's authentic response to anxiety as
an insightful and philosophical way to
encounter Angst. The ultimate situations
of human existence, which manifest
themselves by way of anxiety, represent
the very conditions that hold the
potential to make human life genuinely
meaningful. Death , nothingness, and
thrown ness, disclosed through anxiety,
are precisely what Dasein must accept in
order to exist authentically as its future
(free-for-death), past and inheritance
(its having-been), and present, the
"there," or enpresenting, of existence. It
is of benefit, at this point, to inquire into
the mind-set of the authentic, resolute
Dasein as perceived by Heidegger. Is it
likely that while preparing his extensive
analysis of authenticity, Heidegger was
drawing inspiration from his own existence as a philosopher? Such an assumption
is reasonable, if we envisage the philosopher as one who is attuned and open to
life's most difficult situations.
Of assistance in understanding the
philosopher's mind-set is to recall the
two perspectives from which this essay
has considered anxiety ' S influence. If, on
the one hand, Angst is interpreted in an
inauthentic manner, as a constant threat
to one's healthful existence, Dasein flees
in fear from anxiety's disturbing effects
to the safety and familiarity of the
interpretations of the status quo. If, on
the other hand, Angst is perceived as the
bridge to a unique form of understanding,
which connects Dasein to the finite realities
of its Being-in-the-world, then as opposed
to prefiguring horror and passivity, anxiety

open and receptive to the approach of
Being. The radical, authentic transformation to authenticity occurs when Dasein
owns up to the disclosed "nothingness,"
or nullity, of its Being, which first
manifests itself through the primordial
attunement of Angst.
Conceived as a temporal phenomenon, the Situation is Dasein ' s "moment
of vision" (Augenblick) , or "instant," of
authenticity. "In the instant as an ecstasis,"
writes Heidegger, "the existent Dasein is
carried away, as resolved, into the factically determined possibilities, circumstances, contingencies of the situation of
action" (BP, 287). This is the moment of
enpresenting (the authentic "present" of
ecstatic temporality) when Dasein, accessible and free, projects itself into its
possibilities within the factical and
distinct circumstances of its own unique
life. Such an authentic "resolute" openness to worldly encounters is only
possible because Dasein is a temporal
being that temporalizes, and thus is at
once its future, past, and present as
thrown-projecting Being-in-the-world. The
present, which is held within authentic
temporality , is the sustaining form of
Dasein's authentic choices, the "resolute
rapture with which Dasein is carried
away to whatever possibilities and circumstances are encountered in the
Situation as possible objects of concern"
(BP, 287).
The authentic temporalizing of Dasein
occurs as it projects its finite possibilities , initiating a forward movement
towards itself as resolute Being-towardsdeath in its ownmost potentiality-forBeing. This movement secures a "repetition" of the authentic nullity, or
"nothingness," characterizing Dasein' s
authentic response to the call of conscience. Thrown before the revelations of
anxiety, this future-oriented act of
retrieval is the authentic appropriation of
Dasein's "having-been." In coming to
itself (future) from out of its own
thrown-Being (past), Dasein discloses
the meaning of authentic Being within
the "instant," or enpresenting (present),
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incoherent aspirations work to tear down
our genuine earthly relations. Philosophy
is ultimately concerned with enacting
ways of life that embrace finitude , for
"existence is truly philosophical only
when its knowledge is appropriately
attuned to that which cannot be known,
to a destiny that exceeds oneself."R
Philosophy must take up and challenge
the ultimate uncertainties that comprise
Being-in-the-world. Heidegger accurately
concludes that outside of the single fatality
of death, that uttermost certainty, which
is non-relational and insurmountable, Dasein
is a wealth of potential. Considering the
depth and breadth of his treatment of
authenticity, Heidegger may well be asking
the reader of Being and Time to consider
seriously the life of the philosopher as
representing an " anxious" obligation to
death, which frees herlhim for the joyous
and challenging activity of living.*

announces itself as the harbinger of
Dasein ' s authentic enactment of freedom for its possibilities. As anxiety is
disclosing the insignificance of the world,
authentic Dasein is reinterpreting the
meaninglessness and impossibility of
existence as revelatory. This radical
conversion of the inauthentic view
"signifies that one is letting the possibility
of an authentic potentiality-for-Being be
lit up," i.e., one is behaving philosophically, awakened by the sense of wonder
(BT,393/343) .
The philosopher therefore embraces,
through resolute openness, the limited
and ephemeral nature of the world that
anxiety discloses. To abandon the notion
of a finite worldly existence in search of
meaningful consolation elsewhere (e.g.,
inauthentic worldly projection or otherworldly projection by way of religion) is
to degrade our vast potential, as such

* I thank Professor William McNeiII , author of The Glance of the Eye : Heidegger,
Aristotle, and the Ends of Theory. His comments and suggestions helped to improve
this essay.
Notes
1 Heidegger, Martin, The Concept oj Time. Trans., W. McNeill, bilingual edition (Blackwell:
Oxford), L992, p. IOE. Heidegger's exact quotation concerning Dasein 's authenticity runs thus: "The
authenticity oj Dasein is what constitutes its most extreme possibility of Being. Da<;ein is primarily
determined by this most extreme possibility of Dasein."
2
, "What is
Row: San Francisco), 1993,
and 'fear for,' he who fears
to rescue himself from this
'loses his head' ."

Metaphysics?" Basic Writings. Trans. , David Farrell Krell. (Harper &
p. 100. "Because fear possesses [the] trait of being 'fear in the face of
and is afraid is captive to the mood in which he finds himself. Striving
particular thing, he becomes unsure of everything else and completely

3
, "What is Metaphysics?" Basic Writings. Trans. , David Farrell Krell. (Harper &
Row: San Francisco), 1993, p. ]03. The monumental importance that Heidegger attaches to the Nothing
within his philosophy is expressed directly within the following statement: "Without the original revelation of the Nothing, no self-hood and no freedom ."
4 "Unheirnlichkeit" translates as "uncanny" but means more literally "un-homelike," or "notat-home" (fin. H. 188).
5
, The Concept oj Time. Trans. , W. McNeill , bilingual edition (Blackwell: Oxford),
1992, p. 20B. To understand Dasein and further, Being in general, Heidegger argues that we must first
understand time, for Dasein is temporality. "Dasein is time, time is temporal. Dasein is not time, but
temporality."
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6
, "On the Origin of the Work of Art," Poetry, Language, Thought. Trans.,
A. Hofstadter (Harper & Row: New York), 1971, p. 67. Reflecting on the phenomenon of authentic
"resoluteness" within "The Origin of the Work of Art," Heidegger writes the following: "The
resoluteness intended in Being and Time, is not the deliberate choice of a subject, but the opening
up of human being, out of its capacity in that which is, to the openness of being."
7 Heidegger describes the immediacy of Dasein 's action-taking when resolute for its own
Potentiality-for-Being in the following terms: "Resoluteness does not take cognizance of a
Situation and put that Situation before itself; it has put itself into the Situation already. As resolute,
Dasein is already taking action." (BT, 347/300).
8 McNeill, William, "Care for the Self," Philosophy Today (Spring Issue), p. 62.
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